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Abstract
In this contribution, the Bayesian framework for interpretation of evidence when
applied to forensic speaker recognition is introduced. Different aspects of the use of
voice as evidence in the court are addressed, as well as the use by the forensic expert
of the likelihood ratio as the right way to express the strength of the evidence. De-
tails on computation procedures of likelihood ratios (LR) are given, along with the
assessment tools and methods to validate the performance of these Bayesian forensic
systems. However, due to the practical scarcity of suspect data and the mismatched
conditions between traces and reference populations common in daily casework,
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significant errors appear in LR estimation if specific robust techniques are not ap-
plied. Original contributions for the robust estimation of likelihood ratios are fully
described, including TDLRA (Target Dependent Likelihood Ratio Alignment), ori-
ented to guarantee the presumption of innocence of suspected but non-perpetrators
speakers. These algorithms are assessed with extensive Switchboard experiments
but moreover through blind LR-based submissions to both NFI-TNO 2003 Foren-
sic SRE and NIST 2004 SRE, where the strength of the evidence was successfully
provided for every questioned speech-suspect recording pair in the respective eval-
uations.
Key words: Forensic Speaker Recognition, evidence, interpretation, robust
Bayesian likelihood ratio, Tippett plots
1 Introduction
In the last decade, research has demonstrated that a probabilistic model based
on the odds form of Bayes’ theorem and likelihood ratio seems to be an ade-
quate tool for assisting experts in forensic sciences to interpret evidence [1][10].
This framework can be applied to forensic speaker recognition (FSR) by means
of automatic speaker recognition systems [17][12][8], or making use of classi-
cal phonetic-acoustic techniques [20] as is performed in other forensic areas
[7][13]. Even though the state-of-the-art speaker recognition systems show
sufficient between-speaker discrimination abilities in many modern applica-
tions, as shown in yearly NIST evaluations, a step forward is needed to allow
those systems to be used in a real-life forensic environment. The adaptation
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process is not straightforward, especially when lack of a sufficient amount of
data from the suspect or mismatched conditions (channel, noise, emotions,
language, voice disguise, etc.) between the suspected speaker and questioned
recordings are present, which are usual situations in a forensic environment.
In consideration, ATVS has focused its research on adapting its raw-score-
based NIST-eval-type speaker recognition system to be fully compliant with
the Bayesian interpretation framework, and on developing original contribu-
tions to the robust estimation of likelihood ratios. The dual objective is:
• To provide a meaningful likelihood ratio (LR) for each questioned and sus-
pect speech pair. This will reduce the significant proportion of non-reporting
cases present in forensic speaker recognition because of non-matching con-
ditions or limited quality of the data.
• To guarantee the presumption of innocence in an analyzed case by keeping
LR scores from potential suspected non-perpetrators speakers (non-targets)
smaller than one. This corresponds to not implicitly supporting the prose-
cution hypothesis.
The paper is organized as follows. A brief presentation of the relationship be-
tween the Bayesian data-driven methodology to interpret voice as evidence
in forensic automatic speaker recognition and the Bayesian decision theory
used in speaker verification is presented in Section 2. In Section 3, we fo-
cus on the problems related to likelihood ratio estimation arising from a lack
of a sufficient quantity of data (typically the absence of speech controls) for
within-source distribution estimation, and mismatched recording conditions
for questioned and suspect speech. Then, in Section 4, we discuss the need
for robust LR estimation illustrated by examples from the NFI-TNO 2003
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Evaluation. Algorithms for robust likelihood ratio estimation are developed,
focusing on a novel technique, TDLRA (Target Dependent Likelihood Ra-
tio Alignment), which prevents potential suspected non-perpetrators speakers
(non-targets) from obtaining LR scores greater than one and this way guaran-
teeing the presumption of innocence, critical in forensic applications. In order
to show the effectiveness of these algorithms, Section 5 presents the results
of different tests using the Switchboard I Database. In this same section the
participation of the ATVS forensic speaker recognition system in the 2003
NFI-TNO Forensic Speaker Recognition Evaluation is presented, which gives
the assessment of proposed algorithms in a large (about 25000 tests) real-life
forensic data evaluation. We also show some post-evaluation experiments that
illustrate the effect of channel normalization techniques in forensic systems,
as well as the results in the NIST 2004 Evaluation, which illustrate some
problems of forensic automatic speaker recognition in the case of mismatched
recording conditions. Finally, Section 6 concludes with a global summary.
2 Bayesian Interpretation of Evidence
2.1 Voice as Evidence
A forensic expert has to interpret evidence material in the course of a criminal
investigation. The forensic evidence represents the information extracted by
the forensic scientist which has any relevant information to add to the judicial
process. In the case of a questioned recording (trace), the evidence does not
consist in speech itself, but in the quantified degree of similarity between the
speaker dependent features extracted from the trace, and the speaker depen-
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dent features extracted from recorded speech of a suspect, represented by their
model [20]. In an automatic approach, this similarity measure is quantified by
a similarity score. Thus, let O = {o1,o2, ...,oN} be the observation sequence
of feature vectors extracted from the speech data and λs the suspect model
generated using the suspect material. Under these circumstances we can state
the following:
E = s (O, λs) (1)
where s represents the similarity score. In the case of statistical modelling, the
distribution of the speech features of the suspected speaker can be represented
by a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) [19]. In this case, the score can be
computed by means of the well known log-likelihood ratio formula:
E = s (O, λs) = log f (O |λs )− log f (O |λUBM ) (2)
where f (X |λs ) and f (X |λUBM ) are the probability density functions for the
suspect model and a Universal Background Model (UBM) [19], which are
modeled as mixtures of Gaussians.
2.2 Bayesian Interpretation of Evidence
Bayes’ theorem is an important part of the process of the consideration of the
odds. In fact, the theorem permits the revision, based on new information, of
a measure of uncertainty about the truth or otherwise of an outcome or issue
(such as a hypothesis). The essential feature of Bayesian inference is that it
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permits one to move from prior to posterior probabilities on the basis of data
or subjective assessments [21].
In forensic science, identity of source cannot be known with certainty, and
therefore must be inferred [14]. The inference of identity can be seen as an
individualisation process, from an initial population to a restricted class, or,
ultimately, to unity [5]. Concerning the inference of identity in forensic speaker
recognition, speaker verification and speaker identification (in closed- and
open-set) techniques have been shown inadequate for assessing the evidence in
this field [6]. These techniques implicitly use subjective thresholds, forcing the
forensic expert to make yes or no decisions, which should be devolved upon
the court.
In this paper, Bayes’ theorem and a data-driven methodology to interpret
evidence are adopted for speaker recognition. The discussion benefits from
the extensive research work in other identification-of-the-source forensic fields
(e.g. fingerprint, fibers, DNA or glass trace evidence) [1]. The odds form of
Bayes’ theorem shows how new data (questioned recording) can be combined
with prior background knowledge (prior odds, province of the court) to give
posterior odds (province of the court) for judicial outcomes or issues, as shown
in Equation (3):
Pr (H0|E, I)
Pr (H1|E, I) =
Pr (E|H0, I)
Pr (E|H1, I) ·
Pr (H0| I)
Pr (H1| I) (3)
where Pr (A |B ) denotes a conditional probability value, H0 is the hypothesis
“the suspected speaker is the source of the questioned recording” and H1 is the
hypothesis “another person (within a relevant population of individuals) is the
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source of the questioning recording”. I represents the additional background
information not related with the forensic evidence, such as number of suspects
involved in the case, relationship between the suspect and the crime scene,
etc. Equation (3) allows for revision based on new information of a measure of
uncertainty (likelihood ratio of the evidence (province of the forensic expert))
which is applied to the pair of competing hypotheses.
This hypothetical-deductive reasoning method, based on the odds form of
Bayes theorem, allows the evaluation the likelihood ratio for the evidence (E)
LR =
Pr (E|H0, I)
Pr (E|H1, I) (4)
that leads to the statement of the degree of support for one hypothesis against
the other, considering the circumstances of the case (I) and the result of the
analysis of the questioned recording. In the remainder of this paper, explicit
mention of the circumstances of the case I is omitted in general from prob-
ability statements for ease of notation. The ultimate question relies on the
evaluation of the strength of this evidence provided by an automatic speaker
recognition method. In this case, the functions involved in LR computation
are continuous probability density functions, denoted as
LR =
f (x |H0 )
f (x |H1 )
∣∣∣∣∣
x=E
=
f (E |H0 )
f (E |H1 ) (5)
i. e., the LR is a probability density function ratio evaluated in E as defined
in Equation 1.
It is important to remark that the LR computed in Equation 5 is substantially
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different from the log-likelihood-ratio formula used in Equation 2. The former
relates priors and posteriors given hypotheses H0 and H1, and therefore its
meaning is based on this inference process considering such hypothesis. In
the latter, H0 and H1 are not considered, and the likelihoods computed are
related to similarities between the test speech and the suspect and background
model, respectively. Thus, the evidence score alone (Equation 2) cannot be
used directly to relate priors and posteriors given H0 and H1.
2.3 Likelihood Ratio - Strength of Evidence
The strength of the evidence is the result of the interpretation of the evidence,
expressed in terms of the likelihood ratio of two alternative hypotheses. The
procedure for the calculation and the interpretation of the evidence is pre-
sented in Figure 1. It includes the collection (or selection) of the databases
(or data sets, because of the limited size of the suspect “database”), modeling
and scoring from an automatic speaker recognition system, and the Bayesian
interpretation. The likelihood ratio (LR) summarizes the statement of the
forensic expert in the casework.
The Bayesian interpretation methodology used in this paper needs a two-
stage statistical approach. The first stage consists in modelling multivariate
feature data using Gaussian Mixture Models (GMMs). Figure 2 represents the
statistical distributions of the GMM-based system scores obtained when H0
and H1 are true. Each of them models the probability density (pdf) of the
scores when two recorded voices originate from the same person (H0 is true)
and from different persons (H1 is true)
1 .
1 Similar 2-pdf plots can be easily obtained for every speaker in an assessment test,
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The second stage transforms the data to a univariate projection based on
modelling the similarity scores. The GMMmethod is not only used to calculate
the evidence by comparing the questioned recording (trace) to the GMM of the
but they can also be all pooled together in a single 2-pdf plot using all H0 and H1
scores. In this latter case, the pooled scores are usually used to plot the performance
of the system through DET plots [16].
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suspected speaker (source), but also to produce data necessary to model the
within-source (WS) variability of the suspected speaker (scores from suspect
speech segments when tested with the suspect model), and the between-source
(BS) variability of the potential population of relevant speakers (testing the
questioned speech segment with the models from the potential population),
given the questioned recording. Formally, f (x |H0 ) and f (x |H1 ) in Equation
5 represent the cited within-source variability and between-source variability.
The interpretation of the evidence consists of calculating the likelihood ratio
using the probability density functions (pdfs) of these distributions and the
numerical value of evidence (Figure 3) 2 .
The information provided by the analysis of the questioned recording (trace)
leads to a specification of the initial reference population of relevant speakers
(potential population) having voices similar to the trace, and, combined with
the police investigation, to focus on and select a suspected speaker. Generally,
the methodology used in this paper needs three databases for the calcula-
tion and the interpretation of the evidence: the potential population database
(P), the suspected speaker reference database (R) and the suspected speaker
2 Pooling of speakers or different traces from the same speaker is not possible in
the computation of the likelihood ratio, as a specific between-source pdf is necessary
for every single trace (questioned speech segment). In assessment experiments with
many simulated suspects and H0/H1 hypothesis, it is observed that the LR compu-
tation sustains a non-monotonic transformation from the original scores to the set
of likelihood ratios for the same suspect-questioned speech pairs. As a result, if all
likelihood ratios for the H0/H1 hypothesis are pooled (the final likelihood ratios,
not the scores to compute every LR), different pdfs and then different DET plots
will be obtained for scores and LRs in the same assessment experiment.
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Fig. 3. Likelihood Ratio Computations from K questioned recordings and M sus-
pect models. For simplicity in representation, computations are performed over all
possible Questioned Recording-Suspect trials.
control database (C).
The potential population database (P) is used for modelling the variability of
the speech of all the potential relevant sources, using the automatic speaker
recognition method. P typically consists of a set of speaker models from a
population of non-suspected individuals. In this sense, this population is con-
structed in the same way as the test-normalization (T-Norm) cohorts used in
speaker verification [3]. It allows the evaluation of the between-sources vari-
ability given the questioned recording, which means the distribution of the
similarity scores that can be obtained when the questioned recording is com-
pared to the speaker models (GMMs) of the potential population database.
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The calculated between-sources variability pdf f (x |H1 ) is then used to es-
timate the denominator of the likelihood ratio f (E |H1 ). There are no con-
straints about the method used in this estimation. In this contribution we have
used maximum-likelihood estimation of a GMM distribution. Ideally, the tech-
nical characteristics of the recordings (e.g. signal acquisition and transmission)
should be chosen according to the characteristics analyzed in the trace.
The suspected speaker reference database (R) is necessary to model the sus-
pect’s speech with the automatic speaker recognition method and can be
recorded from the suspect speaker or obtained by other means. When recorded,
speech utterances should be produced in a similar way to those of the poten-
tial population (P) database. The suspected speaker model obtained is used
to calculate the value of the evidence, by comparing the questioned record-
ing to the model. The suspected speaker control database (C) is necessary to
evaluate the within-source variability, when the utterances of this database,
which also can be recorded or obtained from available suspect speech, are
compared to the suspected speaker model (GMM). C database consists of
speech material coming from the suspect himself, and its utterances are com-
pared with suspect speech material too, coming from the R database. Thus,
we obtain target scores from the suspect himself, which are used to estimate
a pdf modelling his within-source variability. This calculated within-source
variability pdf f (x |H0 ) is then used to estimate the numerator of the likeli-
hood ratio f (E |H0 ). Again, the method used in this estimation is not con-
strained. In this contribution we have used maximum-likelihood estimation of
a single-Gaussian distribution. The elements of the C database should consti-
tute utterances that are as equivalent as possible to the trace, according to
the technical characteristics as well as to the quantity and style of speech.
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2.4 Assessment of Bayesian Forensic Systems
Of great interest to the jurists is the extent to which the LRs correctly discrim-
inate “same speaker and different-speaker” pairs under operating conditions
similar to the case in hand. As was made clear in the US Supreme Court deci-
sion in the Daubert case (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 1993) it
should be criterial for the admissibility of scientific evidence to know to what
extent the method can be, and has been, tested. The principle for evaluation of
the strength of evidence used in this paper consists in the estimation and the
comparison of the likelihood ratios that can be obtained from the evidence
E. On the one hand the hypothesis H0 (the suspected speaker truly is the
source of the questioned recording) is assumed and, on the other hand, the
hypothesis H1 (another speaker within a relevant population of individuals is
the source of the questioned recording) is considered. The performance and
reliability of an automatic speaker recognition method is evaluated by repeat-
ing the experiment described in the previous sections, with several speakers
being at the origin of the questioned recording, and by representing the re-
sults using experimental (histogram based) probability distribution plots such
as probability density functions and Tippett plots (Figure 4).
The representation of the results in Fig. 4 is the one proposed by Evett and
Buckleton in the field of interpretation of forensic DNA analysis [9]. The au-
thors have named this representation as “Tippett plots”, referring to the
concepts of “within-source comparison” and “between-sources comparison”
defined by Tippett et al. These probability distributions are also known as
reliability functions.
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2.5 Speaker verification and Speaker Forensic Analysis
In this section we want to clarify the relations between speaker verification,
associated to the use of thresholds, and forensic speaker analysis. In the latter
case, the objective of the scientist is to help the Court in his decision pro-
cess. However, speaker verification is the task of deciding, given a questioned
recording, whether the suspected speaker is the source of this recording. This
is a 2-class task. The two classes in forensic speaker verification are: H0 - the
suspected speaker is the source of the questioned recording, and H1 - another
person is the source of the questioned recording. The output of a speaker ver-
ification system is always a binary decision, independent of the technology
used in the system. The implementation of the system will determine how
this decision is generated. One way of generating the decision output can be
accomplished by using Bayes’ decision theory. The decision rule for the two-
category classification problem can be determined by comparing the score
obtained from a speaker recognition system (see Equation 2) with a decision
threshold:
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chosen class =

H0 if score ≥ θscore
H1 if score < θscore
where θscore is the threshold.
The main drawback of the use of speaker verification in a forensic context is
due to the subjective selection of the threshold by the forensic expert. The
score is compared to the threshold and the suspected speaker is accepted or
rejected as the source of the questioned recording. This interpretation of the
evidence does not correspond to the concept of forensic individualization as
it is widely accepted. Reporting a decision forces the scientist to ignore the
prior probabilities of the case (see Equation 3), usurping the role of the Court
in taking this decision. Even if these thresholds are computed from objective
data, “...the threshold is in essence a qualification of the acceptable level of
reasonable doubt adopted by the expert [...]. Therefore, speaker verification is
clearly inadequate for forensic purposes, because it forces the scientist to make
decisions which are devolved upon the court” [6].
Even if the LR can be used for binary decisions (because a LR can be used as a
detector score), its main importance relies in its allowance to infer the posterior
from the prior when H0 and H1 are being considered. This last property is the
basis of the use of Bayesian inference applied to legal reasoning.
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2.6 Problems in LR Estimation
Forensic speaker recognition in real-world case-work presents some peculiari-
ties that make errors appear in the estimation of LRs if special techniques are
not adopted to avoid them. In this section, we present some of these problems,
showing their origin and consequences for LR estimation.
Generally, in forensic conditions the quality and quantity of the speech data
the forensic expert can handle is far from optimal. This specific environment
usually causes strong mismatches between the questioned, suspect’s and rele-
vant population speech and lack of data for accurate distribution estimations
[2][4]. Moreover, in forensic applications it is convenient, in order to guarantee
the presumption of innocence, that suspected non-perpetrators speakers from
the relevant population do not obtain LR values greater than one, even if it
leads to worse discrimination between suspected perpetrators (targets) and
suspected non-perpetrators (non-targets) speakers.
The problem of between-source variability estimation is related to the selec-
tion and number of available models of the relevant population. Given that
between-source variability distribution represents the random match proba-
bility distribution of the evidence within the relevant population, it should
present the same characteristics as the suspect’s speech data regarding trans-
mission channel, language, etc. Hence, there are many problems to be solved
when such a “matched” reference population is not available [12].
Another important source of problems comes from inadequate estimation of
within-source variability distribution of the suspected speaker. It is possible
in forensic investigations dealing with voice that the forensic expert has only
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a single questioned recording and a single recording of a suspect. The task is
normally to evaluate whether the voice in both these recordings comes from
the same person. As a consequence, it is not always possible to evaluate the
within-source variability of the suspect with this single recording. However,
since this is a recurrent problem in forensic speaker recognition, it is necessary
to define an interpretation framework for evaluating the evidence even in the
absence of additional control recordings [4][12].
3 Algorithms for Robust LR Computation
In this section a number of original contributions will be presented for obtain-
ing reliable LRs in the one-questioned-recording one-suspect-recording con-
dition (as in the detection tasks in NIST SRE and NFI-TNO Evals). These
techniques are also robust when limited or more extensive quantities of data
are available.
3.1 Robustness in Forensic Speaker Recognition
In this paper, robustness is understood as the capabilities of the forensic
speaker recognition system to perform reliable likelihood ratio estimations
in the described forensic environment, where severe mismatched conditions
and limited suspect and trace data are usually present. Then, it is useful to
compare the performance of the forensic system with the corresponding score-
based system used to compute the LR. This is possible by means of plotting
the LRs in a DET plot [16] as if they were used as detection scores, and
comparing the result with the DET plot of the score-based system. In doing
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so, we will observe that a large proportion of the discrimination ability of
the system is lost due to the errors in LR estimation described in section 3.
Consequently, new techniques must be developed to compute more reliable
likelihood ratios for forensic systems to be robust. The following example will
aid in this discussion.
3.1.1 LR Computation in NFI-TNO 2003 Evaluation
The NFI-TNO 2003 Forensic Speaker Recognition Evaluation is described in
detail in section 4.1.3 (details on [15]). For the moment, a detailed explana-
tion is not necessary. We only need to know that, in addition to the main
evaluation task (detection), which is equivalent to the NIST yearly SREs but
with new authentic Dutch forensic data, a new experiment was performed.
In this experiment, namely experiment 6 (“Court Proof”) in the NFI-TNO
Eval, likelihood ratio computation was performed over the submitted score-
based systems presented (Figure 5(a)), simulating a real forensic scenario.
Likelihood Ratios were computed at NFI-TNO and Tippett plots were drawn
to assess Forensic Speaker Recognition performance. These results are shown
in Figure 5(b), showing the best and the worst score-based system, and one
intermediate system.
The “Court Proof” task in the NFI-TNO Eval is then extremely interesting
showing that any automatic speaker recognition system can be adapted to
compute likelihood ratios. However, in this task the need for robustness in
LR estimation has been replaced with a large amount of suspect training
data showing large speaker variability. Sometimes such a large number of
(acknowledged) suspect recordings are impossible to be recovered in a forensic
18
(a) (b)
Fig. 5. (a) NFI-TNO 2003 Evaluation main task results and (b) Court Proof results.
Source: [15].
scenario. The number of available (and “certified”) suspect recordings/calls
can be much smaller in some forensic field cases, and in the limit case we will
have just one questioned recording and one suspect recording.
Therefore, forensic speaker recognition systems performance is good when
there is a sufficient quantity, quality and variety of suspect speech material.
In this case, within-source variability can be properly estimated having high
generalization capabilities. However, in a general case, we will need specific
robust estimation algorithms to cope with forensic scarce data, as shown in
next sections.
3.2 Bootstrapping Suspect Data for Within-Source Distribution Estimation
When there is no possible match between questioned speech and suspect data
conditions, it is desirable to have as many scores as possible with high variabil-
ity to estimate the within-source pdf. A leave-one-out procedure is described
19
here, where N different segments/utterances are needed. Additionally, the ab-
sence of speech controls when a single recording from the suspect is available
will also be solved.
Two cases are considered: monosession and multisession suspect data avail-
ability. In the former, a single suspect recording is available, being then divided
into N uniform length segments (after silence removal); in the latter, N dif-
ferent recordings are available. In both cases N different suspect temporary
models are obtained for every speaker from N − 1 segments/utterances each,
obtaining N similarity scores which will be used for within-source pdf esti-
mation. Once the N scores are obtained, the temporary models are deleted
and the suspect model is obtained from the N segments/utterances available.
In this sense, in each resampling step of the algorithm, the left-out utterance
will be the C database, and the remaining recordings will constitute the R
database. Those N scores will be an acceptable model of session variability in
the multisession case (multiple suspect recordings), but a very optimistic one
in the monosession case (single suspect recording), as test speech is obtained
from the same utterance as the model, giving a highly biased within-source
estimation. This estimate is void of channel and intersession variations and
the variance will typically be underestimated. In the next sub-section, those N
scores will be considered in a different way depending on whether they come
from monosession or multisession data.
3.3 Within-source Degradation Prediction (WDP)
Due to small within-source variances, evidences scoring higher than between-
source estimation but lower than within-source estimation give erratic LR
20
values (unexpected high LR values for non-targets and low LR values for tar-
gets) even when a classical detection system would perform correctly. Further-
more, it is widely known [19] that mismatched conditions between questioned
speech and suspect recordings may imply variations in the score distribution
ranges. So, when there are no speech controls (C database) that could match
the questioned speech conditions in a reliable fashion (as happens in many
real forensic speaker recognition applications), within-source modelling using
non-matching suspect data can give a poor generalization performance, with
the consequence that unreliable likelihood ratios may be obtained. Therefore,
within-source variability should model all the possible situations in which the
questioned speech can appear (regarding noise, time variability, speaker mood,
communication channel, language, etc). Within-source Degradation Prediction
(WDP) is proposed [12] to stand for the unknown degradation expected from
unknown mismatch, assuming no scores from impostors are expected higher
than those in the between-source estimation.
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Figure 6 is a very useful example for understanding the WDP motivation.
We can see five single suspect-single questioned speech trials involving sus-
pected perpetrators extracted from ATVS NIST SRE 2004 system scores.
The plot shows the scores of questioned speech vs. models in the population
(between-source scores), the monosession within-source scores obtained with
the bootstrap procedure described above and the corresponding evidences for
each suspect-questioned recording pair. The figure shows that as monosession
WS scores represent the maximum matching between possible speech excerpts
coming from the same suspect, evidence scores are in almost all cases below
these values, but in any case within these limits (BS and monosession WS).
WDP is then used differently in the two following cases:
• Monosession data: a single suspect recording is available. Scores used to
estimate the within-source model are obtained via leave-one-out from a
single suspect recording as described in previous section. In this case, these
scores determine the maximum value that a target evidence could obtain,
because they are obtained in the best matching conditions.
• Multisession data: several recordings are available. Scores used to estimate
the within-source model represent the known session variability in the sus-
pect data. However, recordings presenting mismatched conditions from the
available suspect data can give different scores.
Formally, let f (x|H0) = N (µWS, σWS) and f (x|H1) the pdfs for the within-
and between-source distribution for a given forensic trial. The WS probability
density function is assumed to be Gaussian. The objective mapped pdf after
WDP is defined as fWDP (x|H0) = N (µWDP , σWDP ). Our goal is to compute
the desired parameters µWDP and σWDP . First of all, we compute slow , which
will be the score that satisfy
22
∞∫
slow
f (x|H1) dx = α (6)
where α is a design value set to 0.01 in this contribution. slow is called the lower
bound for fWDP (x|H0). The computation of µWDP depends on the suspect
data for the given trial. For the monosession case
µWDP =
µWS + slow
2
(7)
and for the multisession case
µWDP = µWS (8)
Once µWDP is computed, a descent algorithm for unconstrained optimization
is used to compute σWDP (both in monosession and multisession cases), given
that it is claimed to satisfy
slow∫
−∞
fWDP (x|H0) dx = α (9)
The effects of WDP on the WS pdf for both monosession and multisession
data are shown in Figure 7.
3.4 WMVL and Outlier Removal
In order to compensate for two types of estimation error, two complementary
techniques are proposed:
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Fig. 7. Within-source Degradation Prediction (WDP).
• Within-source Minimum Variance Limiting (WMVL): even using WDP,
sometimes very low estimated variances are still present due to highly coher-
ent speech controls. WMVL simply limits the minimum variance of within-
source estimations, avoiding possible erratic LR values.
• Outlier removal: within-source model is usually estimated from very few
(less than five) scores. As a result, singularities in one or two speech controls
(very limited quantity of speech, laughing, noise peaks, etc.) can lead to
inconsistent mean estimation. All scores falling under a defined, very low,
between-source-pdf-dependent value are discarded as outliers. Let soutlier be
this value. soutlier must satisfy:
soutlier∫
−∞
f (x|H1) dx = γ (10)
where γ is a fixed system-defined value set to 0.25 in this contribution.
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3.5 Target Dependent LR Alignment (TDLRA)
In the previous section, different techniques have been proposed for obtaining
much greater discriminant capability, but presumption of innocence is still
not guaranteed, as a slight proportion of non-targets still obtain LR scores
greater than one. Recently, we have proposed the use of target dependent score
alignment (TDSA) [11] for signature verification. This score normalization
technique exploits user-dependent information to improve system performance
in a cost detection sense. In the present work, the objective will not be based
on a cost detection function to be optimized per speaker but in guaranteeing
the presumption of innocence for suspected non-perpetrators speakers, which
will be performed on a speaker by speaker basis. This objective will be satisfied
by minimizing the number of suspected non-perpetrators speakers obtaining
LR > 1.
The use of TDLRA in a forensic trial can be described as follows. LetXLR−NT =
{LRNT1, ..., LRNTL} be the non-target LRs obtained from the development
set of non-suspected utterances and the given suspect model. First we esti-
mate the LR pdf for this non-target trials via maximum-likelihood assuming
Gaussian distributions 3 . We denote this pdf as f (x|XLR−NT ) 4 . Let β be the
desired proportion of suspected non-perpetrators with LR > 1. β will be usu-
ally in the 1%− 5% range, and will be an a-priori defined value of the system.
3 TDLRA models the non-target LR distribution in a similar way as ZNorm models
the impostor score distribution for a given target model [11].
4 As this “impostor” LR distribution is modelled with a single Gaussian, a finite
error proportion will always be above LR=1, but the smaller this error proportion,
the bigger will be the percentage of the targets with LR below one.
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We define LRNT−β as the LR value that satisfies
∞∫
LRNT−β
f (x|XLR−NT ) dx = β (11)
TDLRA technique is then applied to the LR for the suspected speaker in the
following way:
LRTDLRA = LR− LRNT−β (12)
Figure 8 illustrates this technique. It is important to note that TDLRA is
applied in operational conditions in an automatic mode.
Fig. 8. Target Dependent Likelihood Ratio Alignment (TDLRA).
TDLRA also has a positive effect on the performance of the system when
conditions are mismatched between the relevant population models and the
suspect model. Since such a mismatch produces a misalignment in LRs ob-
tained for each suspect, normalization between suspects performed by TDLRA
leads to a better global system behaviour.
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4 Experiments
In order to assess the robustness of the proposed LR computation algorithms
described, a wide range of experiments is presented. They are based on trials
constructed with extensively used public databases incorporating blind results
and post-tuning experiments of the ATVS Bayesian forensic recognition sys-
tem in international evaluations like the NFI-TNO Evaluation 2003 and NIST
SRE 2004.
4.1 Databases and Experimental Framework
Results based on experiments using three databases under very different and
challenging conditions are presented. Below is a detailed description for each
experimental framework used.
4.1.1 Switchboard I Experiments
This framework was constructed using a 100 male speaker subset from Switch-
Board I, which consists of landline telephone (different handsets) spontaneous
conversational speech. Suspect models are obtained from 2 minutes of speech
in two different groups:
• Single-session training (monosession): 50 speakers, suspect data is obtained
from a single conversation.
• Multiple-session training (multisession): 50 speakers (different from above),
30 seconds of speech from each call are obtained in each of 4 conversations.
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A variable number of 30 second excerpts per suspected speaker was used as
questioned speech. No manual silence detection was used either in training or
test, and severe co-channel interference is present.
4.1.2 NIST SRE 2004
Since 1996, the NIST yearly Speaker Recognition Evaluations (SRE) [18] have
fostered research and development in speaker recognition. Each year, the cor-
pus and the methodology try to focus on solving the main problems with state
of the art technology. ATVS has participated in these evaluations since 2001,
with its main focus in 2004 being to assess the robustness of the algorithms
used in likelihood ratio computation.
NIST SRE 2004 has introduced many new challenges to the scientific com-
munity. First, a new database has been used, the MIXER corpus, which con-
tains data recorded across different communication channels (landline, GSM,
CDMA, etc.), using different handsets and microphones (carbon button, elec-
tret, earphones, cordless, etc.) and different languages (American English,
Arabic, Spanish, Mandarin, etc.). A new Fisher-Style protocol for recording
acquisition has improved randomness in the spontaneous component of the
conversation. Moreover, the evaluation methodology is also new, giving the
possibility of presenting a system to any task involving one training condition
(10 seconds, 30 seconds, 1, 3, 8 and 16 conversation sides and 3 full conver-
sations) and one test condition (10 seconds, 30 seconds, 1 conversation side
and 3 full conversations). Each conversation side has an average duration of 5
minutes, having 2.5 minutes aprox. after silence removal. Although there were
both genders in the corpus, no cross-gender trials were performed.
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The mandatory task for any participant in NIST SRE 2004 was the core con-
dition. It constituted trials having one conversation side for training and one
conversation side for testing (1side-1side). The core task of the evaluation had
more than 25000 trials. The (Common Evaluation Condition) was a subset of
the core condition, having some special restrictions (all trials were in English,
for example).
In the experimental framework described, strong mismatch between train and
test data may appear, and careful selection of the parameters and components
of the system (development data, population database, normalization sets,
etc.) had to be made. Moreover, MIXER was a corpus never used before and
no development data was provided to participants.
4.1.3 NFI-TNO Forensic SRE 2003
In order to determine the state of the art of text independent speaker recog-
nition systems in a forensic context, and the possibility of using the results
of such systems for investigative purposes in police enquiries, the NFI-TNO
Forensic Speaker Recognition Evaluation [15] was proposed in 2003 by the
Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI) and the Netherlands Organization for
Applied Scientific Research (TNO). The speech material used in the NFI-TNO
forensic speaker recognition evaluation was taken from real police investiga-
tions. This was performed to obtain field data and to emulate as close as
possible a real forensic application. It consists of wire tapped cellular GSM to
GSM telephone conversations recorded over a 23 month period. All speakers
are males. The telephone line quality varies between recordings from excel-
lent to moderate (extremes at the lower end were omitted). The telephone
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handsets used are unknown. The level and nature of background noises of
the material varies and includes slight room reverberation, music in the back-
ground of the recording and in some cases ambient speakers (mostly sounds
of children playing). Although the speaking style was constant (speech con-
taining spontaneous speech, laughter, shouting and whispering was omitted)
emotions varied between recordings from relaxed (frequent) to stressed (rare).
The distribution of these parameters among speakers is not homogeneous. The
range and distribution of recording dates between speakers varies. The ma-
terial was edited by NFI in order to select single speakers and to make the
material anonymous. Care was taken in editing so that no acoustic artifacts
were introduced. Signalling noises in the telephone recordings were removed
but speaking pauses were not edited out. The languages used are Dutch (79%),
English (20%), Sranan Tonga (language spoken in Surinam) and Papiamento
(spoken at the Netherlands Antilles).
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Switchboard I Results
In order to test the proposed robust LR estimation algorithms, a reference sys-
tem is needed to provide raw scores to be used later in the Bayesian system.
Then, the ATVS UBM-MAP-adapted GMM system as submitted to NIST’02
SRE was used, with a UBM trained from 5 hours of male speaker data from a
different Switchboard-I (SWBI) partition. Three experiments will be reported
in this section: ‘monosession’ (50 speakers), ‘multisession’ (50 speakers), and
‘all’ (100 speakers). Performance of this reference system in these three exper-
iments is shown in Figure 9.
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Fig. 9. ATVS NIST SRE 2002 system performance with Switchboard I data. The
reference raw scores are the basis for all algorithms in section 4.
First we present LR computations in the SWBI framework using bootstrap for
obtaining within-source scores, but no other algorithm from those proposed.
Figure 10 shows the performance of our Bayesian forensic speaker recognition
system when ML single-Gaussian within-source estimation is performed di-
rectly from within-source modelling data using the leave-one-out method (N=4
for monosession experiments). Between-source estimation via 32 Gaussian
EM-ML estimation was obtained by means of comparing questioned speech
with the relevant population P (50 multisession 2 minutes-trained speakers).
As shown, performance is poor, both for monosession, where targets un-
likely score close to the optimistic model, leading to low LR values, and for
multisession, where targets just obtain low LR values which suspected non-
perpetrators can also easily obtain due to small variance estimations from
within source data.
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Fig. 10. Tippett Plots with Raw LR. (a) ‘Monosession’, (b) ‘multisession’ and (c)
‘all’ suspect Switchboard data.
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Fig. 11. Tippett Plots using WDP, WMVL and Outlier removal. (a) ‘Monosession’,
(b) ‘multisession’ and (c) ‘all’ suspect Switchboard data.
In Figure 11 the same three experiments as in Figure 10 are reported, where
the basic LR-based system has been significantly improved with the joint use
of the proposed WDP, WMVL and outlier removal both for targets and non-
targets in any of the tested conditions, showing an excellent, but still quite
loose, ‘presumption of innocence’ performance.
Figure 12 presents system performance when TDLRA is used in the same
Switchboard experiments, with two arbitrary values of 1% and 3% for the
desired proportion of non target users supporting the prosecution hypothesis.
From these experiments, the degree of control over system performance with
TDLRA technique is remarkable, especially the control over the presumption
of innocence for non-targets in the desired values.
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Fig. 12. Tippett plots for same system of Figure 11 adding TDLRA. Two config-
urations for TDLRA are shown, with maximum Non-Target errors of 1% (dotted)
and 3% (solid).
4.2.2 NIST 2004 Evaluation Results and Experiments
During the last two years ATVS has focused its research on robust LR com-
putation from raw scores, mainly starting from the core technology we used
in the NIST SRE 2002. In order to participate in NIST SRE 2004, ATVS has
tested some common channel normalization options such as RASTA filtering
and Feature Warping.
In the NIST SRE 2004, ATVS’s main objective was to assess the proposed
robust LR computation procedures and compare them with the score-based
system performance of the rest of the participants. Therefore, ATVS submitted
several systems to different evaluation conditions, as is shown in Table 1.
As it can be seen in the figure, ATVS submitted 5 systems to 3 different
tasks. Systems 2 and 3 (score-based) used different parameter extractors, and
system 1 (primary) was the fusion of both of them. Systems 4 and 5 (forensic)
used scores computed with system 2 to perform robust LR computation by
means of WDP, WMVL and Outlier Removal. In System 5 TDLRA was also
included.
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Table 1
ATVS systems in NIST 2004 SRE.
Test
Train: 1 Side 1 Side 30 Seconds 10 Seconds
Sys1 = Sys2 + Sys3 X
Sys2 X X X
Sys3 X
Sys4 (Forensic LR) X
Sys5 (Forensic LR) X
Figure 13(a) shows ATVS systems performance in NIST SRE 2004. It is in-
teresting to note the difference between systems 2 and 4, and to analyze the
Tippett plots resulting from LR computation performed by system 4, as shown
in Figure 13(b).
Although performance is good in all systems, we can see two undesired effects
in both these plots. First, system 4 (forensic) presents a worse performance in
low False Acceptance rate than its equivalent score-based, system 2. Second,
Tippett plots from system 4 show a sub-optimal behavior in non-targets, even
though separation between curves is acceptable. This effect is justified by
the selection of the relevant population used. As illustrated in [12], and as
will be presented later, a mismatch between target model and population
cohort models in LR computation gives a strong degradation in performance
of trials involving suspected non-perpetrators. ATVS NIST SRE 2004 systems
used two gender-dependent populations, but each one containing models only
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Fig. 13. ATVS systems in NIST 2004 SRE. (a) Comparison of systems 1 to 5 (sorted)
and (b) Tippett plots of system 4.
in English and belonging to different channels (landline carbon and electret
handsets, CDMA and GSM). Therefore, the reference population in use was
not adapted to each suspect model and this mismatch in channel and language
between population and each target model may have caused the described
degradation. In addition, Figure 13 reveals that TDLRA has produced no
improvement in system performance. The reason is again related to matching.
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TDLRA impostor sets used in NIST SRE 2004 were gender-dependent, but
again they contained different channel and language utterances. Therefore,
the mismatch once more biases the algorithm’s impostor modelling, giving a
poor estimate and therefore reducing its beneficial effects.
4.2.3 Results and Experiments in NFI-TNO 2003 Evaluation
Adding to the complexity of the forensic field data available in NFI-TNO
Evaluation 2003, the rules of the evaluation did not provided any development
data nor allowed the use of Dutch data to optimize or adapt the submitted
systems to the evaluation conditions. Several experimental configurations were
proposed:
• Experiment 1 (Main Task): Dutch, 60 second training segments, 15 second
test segments.
• Experiment 2 (Variation of parameters): Dutch, 30-120 second training seg-
ments, 7-30 second test segments, 1-4 sessions.
• Experiment 3 (Limited English Test): 60 second training segments, 15 sec-
ond test segments.
• Experiment 4 (Cross-language test, Dutch test segments): 60 second training
segments, 15 second test segments.
• Experiment 5 (Cross-language test, Non-Dutch test segments): 60 second
training segments, 15 second test segments.
• Experiment 6 (Court proof): same speaker multiple models, test segments
in order to estimate within-source speaker distribution.
ATVS submitted two systems, a “raw” score NIST-eval type system (ATVS-
1, primary) and a Bayesian LR-based forensic system (ATVS-2)[12]. In both
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cases, a GSM-coded version of Switchboard I Extended Data Database was
used both for background modelling (UBM) and the reference population for
LR computation.
However, we want to focus on our secondary system, ATVS-2, the Bayesian
forensic one, fully compliant with the Bayesian framework for the evaluation
of evidence. This system was able to compute robust likelihood ratios for
every single test file of the evaluation when compared to any single suspect
utterance. Note that no extra information is needed in our system even when
having speech controls is a theoretical requirement for LR computation. In
other words, speech controls are directly obtained in our system from suspect
speech with the leave-one-out procedure described above. As a special case, in
experiment 6 -Court proof- speech controls in matched conditions are available
and then in that case there is no requirement for robust LR estimation. The
submitted forensic system performs all robust estimation techniques described
above in section 4 with the exception of TDLRA, as additional Dutch data was
not allowed in the evaluation, obtaining a meaningful likelihood ratio (LR)
with every test-file/suspect-recording pair.
After the submission deadline and once the keys were distributed to partic-
ipants, we have run again the evaluation making use of a Dutch reference
population (extracted from NFI/TNO field data), which was not permitted in
the official evaluation. Anyway, this is a meaningful rule for a language inde-
pendent evaluation but would be nonsense in a real forensic system as the use
of matched data (language, channel,...) always improves system performance.
Moreover, once matched data (in very general terms) became available, we
also ran the evaluation with TDLRA, the robust LR estimation technique
described above which maximally preserves the presumption of innocence of
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suspects, preventing suspected non-perpetrators obtaining LR scores greater
than one.
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Fig. 14. ATVS forensic systems at NFI/TNO eval’03. (a) Submitted (ATVS-2a), (b)
same system with Dutch reference population (ATVS-2b) and (c) TDLRA system
with Dutch reference population. (ATVS-2c)
The results of the submitted forensic system (ATVS-2a) and the post-eval
systems using the Dutch population (ATVS-2b) and TDLRA with the Dutch
population (ATVS-2c) are shown in figures 14 and 15, respectively in the form
of Tippett plots and DET curves. Remarkable results have been obtained with
the forensic systems from two points of view: firstly, a meaningful LR value is
obtained with the three systems for every test-file/suspect-model pair (both
for targets and non-targets), as any LR has itself all the information needed
in Court. And secondly, presumption of innocence is strongly preserved when
TDLRA is applied, where a very small portion of non-targets obtain LR values
greater than one, and about 50% of targets do obtain LR values greater than
one. Note that this is an extremely complex evaluation condition, where more
than 20.000 Dutch files are tested with models obtained with 60 seconds from
a single phone call and test files are just 15 seconds long, and even while 50%
of targets obtain LRs smaller than one, presumption of innocence is preserved
in almost 100% of all cases.
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Fig. 15. ATVS forensic systems at NFI/TNO eval’03. Submitted (ATVS-2a), same
system with Dutch population (ATVS-2b) and TDLRA system with Dutch pop.
(ATVS-2c)
Figure 16 respectively show the results of ATVS-2b (submitted system with
Dutch population) and ATVS-2c (TDLRA system with Dutch population),
in evaluation condition 6 (“Court Proof”), showing excellent performance of
TDLRA in this task.
After the improvements introduced in the ATVS score-based system during
NIST SRE 2004 preparation, our new system was tested again with the NFI
Eval primary condition data. In Figure 17, the performance of our LR-based
forensic system is shown in terms of a Tippett plot for the NFI Eval primary
data. Results show a much better performance even than those shown above
in Figure 14 as better raw scores were available.
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Fig. 16. NFI/TNO eval’03 “Court Proof” condition. (a) Dutch population
(ATVS-2b) and (b) TDLRA (ATVS-2c).
Fig. 17. Tippett plot of the ATVS LR system obtained from warping+TNorm scores
in the NFI Eval primary condition (Post-Evaluation experiments).
5 Conclusions
The Bayesian framework for the interpretation of evidence when applied to
forensic speaker recognition has been introduced in this contribution. Different
aspects of the use of voice as evidence in Court, as well as the use from the
forensic expert of the likelihood ratio as the right way to express the strength
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of the evidence have been reported. Details on computation procedures of
likelihood ratios have been given, along with the assessment tools and methods
to validate the performance of those Bayesian forensic systems. State-of-the-
art speaker recognition systems are able to compute likelihood ratios when
enough suspect data is available as has been proved in the “Court Proof” task
of NFI-TNO 2003 Forensic Speaker Recognition Evaluation. However, due to
the practical scarcity of suspect data and the mismatched conditions between
traces and reference populations in daily casework, significant errors appear
in LR estimation if specific robust techniques are not used. Some original
contributions have been proposed for obtaining robust likelihood ratios under
real forensic conditions. The need for robust algorithms in this estimation
process has been discussed, and its use justified, especially in cases where
there is a considerable lack of data. We have proposed a set of algorithms,
namely WDP, WMVL, WS Outlier Removal and TDLRA, that not only allow
forensic systems to estimate robust likelihood ratios, but also make it possible
for them to work in extreme circumstances, as happens when there is a single
suspect recording and a single questioned call. The proposed algorithms have
been assessed both with Switchboard landline telephone data, NFI-TNO GSM
forensic field data and NIST SRE 2004 multichannel, multilanguage data.
Special mention must be made of TDLRA (Target Dependent Likelihood Ratio
Alignment), a novel algorithm that preserves the presumption of innocence
for suspected but non-perpetrators speakers in all the reported Switchboard
experiments and NFI-TNO Evaluation.
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